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The Prosecutor's Obligation to
Grant Defense Witness Immunity
By Bennett L. Gershman*
The author enumerates the three most common situations in
which the courts have required the prosecutor to offer immunity to
defense witnesses: (/) to safeguard the defendant's right to essential
exculpatory testimony; (2) where the use of the prosecutor's powers
to grant immunity causes such distortion in the fact-finding process
as to require granting immunity to defense witnesses; and (3) where
immunity is required to remedy prosecutory misconduct such as the
intimidation of witnesses. The use of the "missing witness" instruction to avoid reaching the constitutional issue is also discussed.

The recent trial of Bernhard Goetz, the subway gunman,
focused attention on a recurring conflict in criminal justice
between a defendant's right to a fair trial, and the enormous
discretion of the prosecutor in deciding whom to prosecute and
whom to absolve from criminal liability . Specifically, the case
raised the question of the prosecutor's obligation, if any, to
grant defense witness immunity. In Goetz, 1 the prosecutor immunized two of the four victims, who testified against Goetz.
The defense sought the testimony of a third victim, Barry Allen,
but he refused to testify unless granted immunity. The prosecutor refused to grant Allen immunity as a matter of "trial strategy." Assuming that such refusal was arbitrary and impaired
the defendant's ability to mount a complete defense, what remedies are available, if any, to repair the harm?
Authority of Prosecutor

As a general rule, the prosecutor has exclusive statutory
authority to grant immunity to potential witnesses, and his
discretion in using this important law enforcement tool is vir-

* Practicing
I

Attorney, White Plains, New York.

People v. Goetz, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Sup. Ct.1987).
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tually unfettered. 2 Occasions may arise, however, when, as in
the Goetz case, the defense seeks to have a reluctant witness
granted immunity, a for example when a particular witnes '
can give favorabl testimony for the defendant but refuse to
testify on ground s of e lf-incriminati n. Can the defendant in
such circumstances require the prosecutor to grant defense witness immunity?3 And if the prosecutor refuses, does the court
have inherent power to confer immunity?
The problem has con titutional overtones. The prosecutor's
refusal to grant defense witnes immunity can deprive the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial,4 as well as his
Sixth Amendment right to use compulsory process to obtain
favorable witnesses. s Some courts draw an analogy between the
prosecutor's refusal to grant defense witness immunity and his
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence as required under
Brady v. M myland, 6 for both actions can violate a similar right
of the defendant by depriving him of exculpatory evidence,
which is necessary to present an effective defense.
Although the Supreme Court has not decided this issue,
lower courts have confronted the problem in different ways
depending on the circumstances giving rise to a defense request
for immunity. The courts generally agree that prosecutors can-

**

**

2 See 18 U.S.c.
6002, 6003 (1970); N .Y. Crim. Proc. Law
50.20, 50.30
(McKinney 1967); United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978).

) An important distinction s hould be made between granting lransactional immunity, which protects the witness from prosecution for the ubSlantive maller about
which he give evidence (sec N. Y. rim . Proc. L'lW 50.20 (M Kinney 1967),
pmviding transactional immunity) , and lise immunity , whic h protects the witne only
from having hi s testimony and derivative informaii n used against· him . See 18
U.S . . 6002 (providing use and derivative use immunity). To pass constitutional
muster, an immunity statute need confer only use immunity. Kastigar v. United
States. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In onsidering defense witness immunity, the scope of
the immunity is clearly a relevant concern. Compare Earl v. Uniled States, 361 F.2d
531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), ee l'l . denied, 388 U.S . 921 (1967) (transactional immunity) with
United SLate' v. Herman , 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) (use immunity) .

*

*

4

United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978).

5 See Western, "The Compulsory Process Clause, " 73 Mich . L. Rev. 71,166-170
(1974).

6373 U.S. 83 (1963); see United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512,515-516 (4th Cir.
1979); United States v. Leonard , 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also
Note, "Right of Criminal Defendant to Compelled Testimony of Witness," 67
Colum. L. Rev. 953, 958 (1967).
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not be required to grant witnesses statutory immunity. 7 Most
courts further refuse to confer judicial immunity upon witnesses
even when the witness can provide essential exculpatory information available from no other source. 8 These courts reason
that first, such immunity decisions would carry the judiciary
into policy assessments that are the traditional domain of the
executive branch 9 and second, immunity would be subject to
abuse by the defense. 10
To be sure, the opportunities for abuse by the defendant of
immunity are considerable. It is not difficult to imagine that
many more defendants would produce witnesses willing to give
exculpatory testimony but only if they were granted immunity.
Improper collusive arrangements would be encouraged to the
prosecutor's detriment. Defendants would obtain the benefit of
possibly fabricated evidence and the source of that evidence
might escape prosecution by virtue of immunity. Even limiting
the immunity granted these witnesses to use immunity would
still make the prosecutor's task difficult. If the prosecutor was
required to dispense even limited-use immunity to such witnesses, the prosecutor, if he subsequently chose to prosecute
that witness, would have the burden of showing that his evidence did not derive from the immunized testimony. 11
On the other hand, some courts have invoked their inherent
authority to dispense immunity in special circumstances, most
notably when the witness can offer crucial exculpatory tes-

7 United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1077 (1980; United States v. Bowling, 666 F.2d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1981).

8 Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v; Thevis, 665
F.2d 616, 639 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1315 (8th Cir.
1976); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534-535 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 921 (1967).
9 United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980) , cert. denied, 449 U .S.
1077 (1981) ("confronting the prosecutor with a choice between terminating prosecution of the defendant or jeopardizing prosecution of the witness is not a task congenial to the judicial function").
10 In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973) ("a person suspected ofacrime
should not be empowered to give his confederates an immunity bath").

11 Kastigar V. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). By similar reasoning, Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), distrusting declarations against penal interest used to
exonerate a defendant, requires corroboration before such statements may be introduced.
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timonyl2; when the prosecutor one-sidedly immunizes certain
witnesses who testify for the government but refuses to grant
reciprocal immunity to other witnesses who can give helpful
testimony for the defendant l3 ; and when the prosecutor, by
threats or other misconduct, intimidates defense witnesses into
refusing to testify. 14
Immunity for Essential Exculpatory Testimony

Several courts have held that due process requires granting
immunity to defense witnesses to safeguard the defendant's
right to essential exculpatory testimony and compulsory process. IS In Virgin Islands v. Smith,16 the defendant requested
immunity for an exculpatory witness who was under the jurisdiction of the juvenile authorities of the Virgin Islands attorney
general. That office offered the witness immunity on the condition (prompted by prosecutorial courtesy) that the U.S. attorney consent. For unexplained reasons, the consent was refused.
The Third Circuit held that judicial immunity was available
when (1) immunity was properly sought in the district court, (2)
the witness was available to testify, (3) the proffered testimony
was both essential and clearly exculpatory, and (4) no strong
governmental interests countervailed against an immunity
grant. 17
Several circuits have disagreed with the Third Circuit's
approach. IS Other courts, while denying immunity in the cases
12 Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); People v. Owens, 97
A.D.2d 855,469 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d 824, 472 N.E.2d 26,
482 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1984); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 2d 17, 321 N.E.2d 890
(1974).

i3 United States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion);
United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); People v. Chin, 67
N.Y.2d 22,490 N.E.2d 505, 499 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1986); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d
241,423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981).
14 United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); People v. Shapiro, 50
N.Y.2d 747, N.E.2d 897,431 N.Y.S.2d 422,409 (1980).
IS United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1985); Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978);
People v. Owens, 97 A.D.2d 855, 469 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1983), rev'd, 63 N.Y.2d
824,472 N.E.2d 26, 482 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1984).

16

615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).

17

[d. at 972.

18

See cases cited at note 7 supra.
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before them, have left pen the possibility that immunity could
be granted in a particular case if the defendant's interest outweighed any legitimate prosecution interest. 19 The Second Circuit, in United Slates l. Turk.ish,20 set forth its own balancing
test, as follows:
.
No duty is imposed upon the prosecutor; he simply has an option to rely
upon the witness' status as an actual or potential larget of prosecution to
foreclose any inquiry concerning immunity for lhat witness. If a ca e
should arise where the witness is not an indicted defendant and the
prosecutor cannot or prefers not to present any claim that the witness i
a potential defendant, and if the defendant on triaJ demon tnued that the
witness' testimony will clearly be materiaJ, exculpat ry, and not
cumulative, it will be time enough to decide whether in those circumstances a court has any proper role wilh respect to defense witness
immunity.21

Reciprocal Immunity

The prosecutor's uneven and discriminatory use of his powers to grant immunity might so distort the fact-finding process as to require granting immunity to defense witnesses. 22
Thi suggestion of a reciprocal immunity rule originated in Earl
v. United Stales,23 in a decision by former Chief Justice (then
circuit judge) Burger. In Earl, the Court of Appeals for the
District of CoLumbia heJd that the government's refusal to grant
immunjty to a discharged co-defendant and require him to testify did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The court,
however, noted that a defendant in some circumstances could
be deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor's uneven use of his
immunity-granting powers:
We might have quite different, and more difficult, problems had the
Government in this case secured testimony from one eyewitness by
19 United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 517-520 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 908 (1980); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-1082 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 359 N.E.2d 688,
391 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1976), cerro denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).

20

623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).

21

[d. at 778-779; see also United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425, 429 (2d Cir. 1985).

22 United States v. Hetman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978) (prosecutor
withholds immunity with "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact-finding
process"); see also United States v. D'Antonio, 801 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1986).

23

361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
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granting him immunity while declining to seek an immunity grant for
Scott to free him from possible incrimination to testify for Earl. That
situation would vividly dramatize an argument on behalf of Earl that the
statute as applied denied him due process. Arguments could be advanced that in a particular case the Government could not use the
immunity statute for its advantage unless Congress made the same
mechanism available to the accused. 24

This suggestion in EarL was applied in a decision in the
Southern District of New York in United States v. DePaLma. 25
There, the prosecutor gave immunity to certain individuals involved in a racketeering scheme but refused to grant immunity
to other participants. The court specifically held, as follows:
Where the foundation of the government's case against Horowitz [the
defendant] was built by means of a farreaching immunity grant, and
where the evidence sought by the defendant is affected by the government's continuing investigation of the potential defense witnesses, the
denial of limited use immuf!ity resulted in an unfair trial. 26

The court concluded that the appropriate relief would be not
to dismiss the indictment but rather to grant a retrial wherein the
government witnesses' testimony would be excluded unless
required-use immunity was granted to potential defense witnesses. 27
Immunity to Remedy Prosecutorial Misconduct, Such as
Intimidation of Witnesses

As noted previously, courts have recognized the potential
for prosecutorial abuse in the uneven granting of, or refusal to
grant, witness immunity with the deliberate intention of distorting the fact-finding process. 28 A flagrant example of such misconduct is forcing a defense witness into silence by threatening
prosecution if the witness chooses to testify. Courts have rem-

24

ld. at 534 n.l (emphasis in original) .

2S

476 F. Supp. 775 (S .D.N .Y. 1979).

26ld. at 781.
27

See also United States v. Saettele, 585 F.2d 307, 310-314 (8th eir. 1978).

28 See also United States v. LaCoste, 721 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1983) (prosecutor's
refusal to stipulate to conversation with witnesses who refused to testify "reprehensible conduct").
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edied such abuses by requiring that the witness be granted
immunity as a condition to subjecting the defendant to trial. In
United States v. Morrison,29 for example, the prosecutor improperly caused the defendant's principal witness to withhold
her testimony out of fear of self-incrimination. The prosecutor
repeatedly warned the witness of the possibility of a federal
perjury charge if she testified and conducted a highly intimidating personal interview with the witness prior to trial. To cure
such misconduct, the court ordered a new trial, stating that "in
the event the defendant calls Sally Bell as a witness, if she
invokes her fifth amendment right not to testify, a judgment of
acquittal shall be entered unless the Government, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. 6002, 6003, requests use immunity for her testimony. ' ,30
Similarly, in People v. Shapiro,31 the prosecutor repeatedly
threatened several important defense witnesses with perjury
charges if they gave testimony for the defendant that differed
from testimony they had previously given. The witnesses refused to testify unless granted immunity and the defendant was
convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and authorized a new trial only if the prosecutor extended immunity to these witnesses. A prosecutor's warning to
potential witnesses of their possible liability for fal e statements, said the court, "must not be emphasized to the point
where they are transformed instead into instruments of intimidation." The prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity, couched
in such "menacing terms," served no purpose other than to
bind the witnesses irretrievably to their previous sworn statements, accurate or not. "By doing this, it impermissibly affected their meaningful exercise of their Fifth Amendment
rights and insured their unavailability as witnesses for the defendant. "32

29

535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).

30Id. at 229. Other courts have acknowledged the role of use immunity as a
remedy for this type of prosecutorial behavior. See United States v. Lord, 711 F .2d
887 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1980).
31

50 N.Y.2d 747, 409 N.E.2d 897, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1980) .

3Z

It!. at 761,409 N.E.2d at 904,431 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
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The "Missing Witness" Instruction

There are circumstances in which a court may provide an
effective remedy against the prosecutor's refusal to grant a
witness immunity without reaching the constitutional issue by
means of the so-called missing witness inference. A good illustration is found in the Goetz case itself. 33
In that case, the prosecution called one witness, Barry Allen, on its direct case. Allen invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege and the prosecution refused to offer him immunity.
The People had already immunized two other witnesses to the
events on which the defendant was indicted for attempted murder and other felonies. As mentioned earlier,34 it was acknowledged by the prosecution that immunity was being withheld
from Allen as a matter of trial strategy and that the prosecution
had no interest in pressing criminal charges against Allen. 35
Defendant then sought a "missing witness" charge to the
jury that "they may infer if they wish, that the testimony of
Barry Allen would not have been favorable to the People. "36
Such a charge is appropriate when "there is an available, uncalled witness in a position to give material evidence that is not
simply cumulative and that would naturally be expected to be
favorable to the party who has failed to call him. "37
The court considered the elements of the missing witness
charge and concluded that Allen qualified as such a witness and
that defendant had established a right to the charge. At this
point, the court explained, "the burden shift[ed] to the prosecutor to account for the absence of the witness or to demonstrate
that the charge would be inappropriate. "38
While conceding that a witness who invokes his privilege
against self-incrimination is unavailable for many purposes,39
33

People v. Goetz, 516 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (S. Ct. 1987).

34

See text at p. 14 supra.

35

Goetz, N.Y.S.2d at 1008.

36/d. at 1010. The case, according to the opinion, presented the question for the
first time in New York State.
37

[d. at 1008 (citing J. Richardson, Evidence § 92, at 66 (10th ed. Prince 1970)).

38

Goetz, N.Y.S.2d at 1009.

39 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 94, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 257 N.E.2d 16
(admission against penal interest); Richardson on Evidence §§ 258, 260; Fed. R.
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this factor will enable a prosecutor to escape a missing witness
inference only if he furnishes a reasonable explanation for his
failure to offer immunity. 40
At this point, the assistant district attorney argued that the
People need not offer any ~xplanation for its failure to confer
immunity since this matter was one of prosecutorial discretion.
While conceding that the discretion was broad, the court found
it was reviewable for abuse. It said: "Contrasting any reasonable grounds for withholding immunity, the case at bar exhibits
selectivity among the shooting victims [in the granting of immunity] that goes without explanation other than trial strategy.
This is insufficient to carry the People's burden of demonstrating that the missing witness charge is inappropriate. To countenance such a strategy would rouse profound constitutional
questions of the defendant's right to confront the witnesses
against him under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and to his right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' '41
When, as in the Goetz case, a "missing witness" instruction
is given, the instruction may be of far greater benefit to the
defense than the witness's testimony. The instruction not only
suggested that Allen's testimony would have been unfavorable
to the defense, but also permitted the jury to speculate on the
prosecutor's motive in not calling the witness.

Conclusion

The judiciary's somewhat tentative response to the prosecutor's refusal to grant defense witness immunity reflects a more
general reluctance by the courts to interfere with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion absent a showing of misconduct or
abuse. This reluctance is noticeable in other important areas of
prosecutor decision making such as charging, plea bargaining,
and dismissals. The courts' deference is accountable, in part, to
the theory of separation of powers and also the fear of abuses of
the immunity laws. When, however, the prosecutor uses his
Evid. 804 (admissibility of former testimony, of statement against interest and of
statements of personal or family history).
40

State v. Dachtler, 318 N.W.2d 769,774 (N.D. 1982) (dictum).

41

Goetz, N.Y .S.2d at 1010.
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immunity-granting powers to distort the fact-finding process,
a court may invoke due process to repair the damage. This
distortion may occur, for example, when he builds a case by
immunizing several government witnesses and refuses to immunize other participants, or threatens potential defense witnesses with prosecution if they testify.
Accommodating the interests of a reluctant witness who
refuses to give evidence on- grounds of self-incrimination and
the defendant's interest in a fair trial may ultimately require
legislation. A statute could be enacted providing for limited-use
immunity under the kinds of circumstances described in this
article and authorizing the trialjudge to dispense immunity after
certain statutory preconditions have been met, namely, a showing of what the witness's testimony would be, his refusal to
testify after properly asserting a privilege, and the reasons for
the prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity. If the prosecutor
does not provide satisfactory reasons for withholding immunity,
the trial judge should be empowered to confer it.
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